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Abstract
Companies  doing  business  cross-boarders  in  Europe  can  choose  between  several
national and European legal alternatives. In the centre of this paper, are two of them:
alternatives provided by the freedom of  establishment and the European company
statute. The focus of this paper is not on the practical implications of these two action
alternatives for enterprises, but on the judicial issues arising in this context.
After presenting the current rulings of the European Court of Justice regarding the
freedom of establishment and the basic contents of the legal acts, council regulation
No.  2157/2001  and  council  directive  No.  2001/86/EC,  regarding  the  European
company (SE), two issues of great importance are examined in this context: the issue
of the governing law and the issue of harmonisation. Finally it is presented to the
reader  to  what  extent  those  European  provisions  are  consistent,  respectively,
constrain one another.
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Developments of European company law
Developments of European company law
The European  Union (EU)  continuously grows.  Member  States  move together
politically as well as economically. Stability and moreover predictability of the law
is vital for European companies in order to assert their position in a globalised
competition. Consequently, the importance of European company law initiatives
has increased constantly. The field of company law is seen as one of the most
dynamic in the European dimension (Bayer, 2004), even though legal initiatives
concerned mostly public limited companies and ignored private limited companies
in the past. In this context, the various company law directives and the creation
of the European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG) are of great importance1.
After a period in the 1990s in which hardly any advancement was made in this
field,  the  debate  revived recently.  Especially,  current  rulings of  the  European
Court of Justice (ECJ) regarding the freedom of establishment and the freedom of
capital, the Council's agreement on the European company (Societas Europaea =
SE),  and  the  Commission's  action  plan  of  modernising  company  law  and
enhancing corporate governance in the EU2 stimulated discussion and accelerated
progress in this area. However, it would go far beyond the scope of this paper to
discuss all of these initiatives in detail.
The focus of this paper is on the effects of two initiatives and their interaction:
the ECJ rulings on the freedom of establishment and the SE. After presenting the
fundamental statements of the ECJ and the fundamental provisions regarding the
SE,  it  is  examined  in  what  way  these  two  legal  initiatives  are  consistent,
respectively, constrain each other. For that reason, two aspects are distinguished
and are examined below: first of all the connecting factor for the governing law,
meaning  the  issue  of  incorporation  versus  real  seat  theory;  and  secondly,
harmonisation, meaning the issue of regime competition versus approximation.
The Freedom of Establishment – Recent Rulings of the
European Court of Justice
The freedom of establishment is one of the principle freedoms granted by the EC
Treaty. It grants all EU citizens the establishment in any Member State and the
practice of self-employment in that Member State. This is not only applicable to
natural  persons  but  also  to  legal  persons.  For  the  latter  one,  primary  and
1  For details see http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/company/company/
official/  index.htm  
2 For details see http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/company/company/
modern/  consult/  report_en.pdf  
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secondary freedom of establishment can be distinguished. Primary freedom of
establishment is  understood  as  the right to establish the headquarters,  while
secondary  freedom  of  establishment  concerns  the  setting-up  of  agencies,
branches,  or  subsidiaries  (ECT  Articles  43  and  48).  Generally  speaking,  any
limitation of freedom of establishment or movement of capital must be justified
by imperative requirements in the general interest that must be suitable to attain
the objective and must be reasonable.
Since  1988,  the  ECJ  took  four  fundamental  decisions  on  the  freedom  of
establishment of legal persons, namely the Daily Mail Case, the  Centros Case,
the  Überseering Case, and the Inspire Art Case, which are presented in more
detail below. The Daily Mail and General Trust PLC (Case 81/87 from September
27th, 1988) wanted to transfer its head office from the UK to the Netherlands,
because  high  hidden  reserves  should  have  been  sold  under  more  favourable
Dutch tax law. From a company law perspective there is no issue, because both
countries follow incorporation theory resulting in unlimited legal capacity of the
company. However,  the transfer of the head office was subject  to the Inland
Revenue's agreement due to tax law provisions. As the Inland Revenue wanted
to keep its tax claim on the hidden reserves, it rejected the transfer. The ECJ
argued in this case that the limitation of transfer of head office is not considered
as a violation of the freedom of establishment, for the reason that the freedom of
establishment  is  granted  by  the  possibility  to  set-up  agencies,  branches,  or
subsidiaries. The ECJ even said that a right to transfer the head office from one
Member State to another is not indicated by Articles 43 and 48 ECT due to the
status-quo of  community law. Consequently, the Inland Revenue could refuse
moving out.
In Centros (Case C-212/97 from March 9th, 1999), the ECJ had to take a decision
on the secondary freedom of establishment.  A Danish couple found a private
limited company (ltd.) in the UK, where it did not commence operations at all.
Then, they wanted to register a branch in Denmark, which was rejected, because
the Centros ltd. did not keep Danish minimum capital requirements and, thus, by
forming a British ltd. intentionally evaded Danish company law. The issue in this
case is not the freedom of establishment, but which precautionary restrictions
can  be  taken  by  Member  States  against  companies  that  do  business  in  its
country but are subject to foreign law in order to protect domestic stakeholders,
such as creditors, employees, or minority shareholders (Roth, 2000).
In this  case,  the ECJ decided that  registration cannot  be refused by Member
States due to the fact that companies that were formed in accordance with the
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law  of  another  Member  State  intentionally  evaded  national  provisions.  “That
interpretation does not, however, prevent the authorities of the Member State
concerned from adopting any appropriate measure for preventing or penalising
fraud” (paragraph 39). However, these measures must fulfil the four conditions
test:  “they  must  be  applied  in  a  non-discriminatory  manner;  they  must  be
justified  by  imperative  requirements  in  the  general  interest;  they  must  be
suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; and they
must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it” (paragraph 34). In
Centros, these conditions were not fulfilled (see paragraphs 35, 37 and 38).
In Überseering (Case C-208/00 from November 5th, 2001), the ECJ dealt with the
questions if it is in the spirit of Articles 43 and 48 ECT to recognise the legal
capacity and the capacity to be a party to legal proceedings of companies that
are incorporated in accordance with the law of another Member State, even if
this company has transferred its head office to this second Member State. The
subsequent issue is if Member States should evaluate the legal capacity and the
capacity to be a party to legal proceedings of companies  by the law of  their
countries  of  incorporation  (paragraph  21).  Überseering  BV,  incorporated  and
registered  in  the  Netherlands,  was  owner  of  a  property  in  Düsseldorf  and
engaged a company for the refurbishment of a hotel and a garage on the site.
The contractual obligations were fulfilled, but Überseering BV claimed that the
paint  work  was  performed  poorly.  During  the  argument  out  of  court,  two
Germans took over most of the business share, resulting de facto in a transfer of
the  administrative  centre  from  the  Netherlands  to  Germany.  In  1996,
Überseering BV brought the action before the court and claimed compensation of
expenses incurred in remedying the defects.  The Landesgericht and later the
Oberlandesgericht dismissed the case, because a company incorporated under
Dutch law, but with its head office in Germany, does not have legal capacity in
Germany  and,  thus,  could  not  bring  legal  proceedings  there  (paragraph  9).
Actually, a company validly incorporated under the law of another Member State
and  with  its  registered  office  there  does  not  have  an  alternative  to
reincorporation in Germany, if it wished to enforce its rights before a German
court (paragraph 79).
Here  the  ECJ  argued  that  the  requirement  of  reincorporation  of  the  same
company in Germany even must be considered as the negation of freedom of
establishment (paragraph 81) and consequently is incompatible with Articles 43
and 48 ECT (paragraph 82). The ECJ decided that “where a company formed in
accordance with the law of a Member State ('A') in which it has its registered
office  exercises  its  freedom of  establishment  in  another  Member  State  ('B'),
Articles 43 EC and 48 EC require Member State B to recognise the legal capacity
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and, consequently,  the capacity to be a party to legal proceedings which the
company enjoys under the law of its State of incorporation ('A')” (paragraph 95).
The last case presented is the Inspire Art Case (Case C-167/01 from September
30th, 2003). In this case,  the ECJ had to decide, whether Member States are
allowed to put limitations on foreign companies incorporated under the law of
another Member State that have been recognised already. Thus, the Inspire Art
case  starts  up where  the  Überseering decision  ends.  Inspire  Art  was  formed
under British law as a private limited company and registered in the UK. It had a
branch  in  the  Netherlands,  which  was  registered  in  the  commercial  register
without any indication that it was a formally foreign company within the meaning
of Article one of the WFBV (Wet op de Formeel Buitenlandse Vennootschappen =
Law on  Formally  Foreign  Companies).  Due  to  the  fact  that  Inspire  Art  dealt
exclusively  in  the  Netherlands,  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  applied  to  the
Kantongerecht  te  Amsterdam that it should be added to the registration that
Inspire Art is a formally foreign company resulting in the application of stricter
provisions regarding disclosure, accounting, and minimum capital requirements.
Inspire Art  denied that  its  registration  was incomplete.  In the  following legal
conflict, the Kantongerecht asked the ECJ to decide if Articles 43 and 48 preclude
the  Netherlands  from  attaching  additional  conditions  to  companies  correctly
formed under the law of another Member State but dealing exclusively in the
Netherlands  and,  furthermore,  if  the  WFBV  contravenes  Community  law
(paragraph 39).
The  ECJ  decided  that  only  those  requirements  of  the  WFBV  comply  with
Community law that correspond to the disclosure requirements set out in the
11th Council  Directive  (89/666/EEC).  The  other  requirements  -  going  beyond
Community  law  -  are  not  permissible,  respectively,  do  not  comply  with  the
freedom of establishment (Schanze/Jüttner, 2003). In Inspire Art, the ECJ again
stresses that the fact alone that a company choses the least restrictive company
law “is  not  sufficient  to  prove  the existence  of  abuse  or  fraudulent  conduct”
(paragraph  139)  which  could  justify  national  restrictions  on  the  freedom  of
establishment  (Triebel/Hase,  2003).  Overall,  the  essence  of  the  Inspire  Art
decision  can  be  seen  in  that  Member  States  must  recognise  and  respect
companies formed in accordance with the law of another Member State and that
Member States are not allowed to impose special procedural or liability provisions
on them (Bayer, 2003).
In sum, the ECJ has developed step by step a consistent case law regarding
companies' freedom of establishment (Eidenmüller/Rehm, 2004). First, it decided
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on the question as to limitations on the moving out of companies (Daily Mail),
then, on the issue of moving in (Centros) and on the recognition of companies'
legal  capacity  (Überseering).  Lately,  the  ECJ  decided  on  the  question  as  to
additional  limitations  to  foreign  companies,  incorporated  correctly  in  another
Member State but doing business solely in this Member State (Inspire Art). By
that consistent jurisprudence, the ECJ did not only begin to clarify the scope of
the freedom of establishment but also provided companies with predictability of
law (Lutter, 2003; Maul/Schmidt, 2004). Thus, taking advantage of freedom of
establishment  can  be  considered  as  a  “real”  alternative  with  respect  to  the
decision on the legal structure of a company.
The European Company Statute
On October 8th, 2001, after more than 30 years of discussion3, the Council of
Ministers enacted two legal instruments: the council regulation (No. 2157/2001)
on the Statute for a European company (SE), subsequently referred to as SE/Re,
and the council directive (2001/86/EC) supplementing the Statute for a European
company with regard to the involvement of employees, subsequently referred to
as SE/Di. But why did  it take the Member States more than 30 years to agree on
the SE? In this context, two major obstacles can be identified: the scope of an
European group law and employee involvement.
The first obstacle was overcome with the Commission's proposals in 1989 and
1991 (European Commission, 1989a and 1989b; European Commission, 1991a
and 1991b), a complete revision of the 1970 proposal which would have created
a  comprehensive  European  group  law (European  Commission,  1970).  In  this
proposal the SE became a hybrid form. This means that the institutional frame of
the European company is governed by Community law, while certain aspects,
such as tax law or  capital maintenance requirements,  are subject  to national
provisions.  At  the  same  time,  the  proposal  was  divided  into  two  parts:  a
regulation  on  the  statute  of  the  European  company  and  a  directive
supplementing  this  regulation  with  regard  to  the  standing  –  explicitly  not
participation  -  of  employees.  Regarding  employee  participation,  the  directive
would have put companies in the position to choose between three equivalent
models of employee involvement – equivalent in the view of the Commission.
Due to Member States' disagreement4 on employee involvement, the matter was
3 The roots of the European company even go back to the French Notary Convention in
1959  where the  French  notary  Tibièrge  suggested  the  introduction  of  a  European
public limited company (Bärmann, 1970).
4 Especially  Germany, Ireland, and the UK disagreed with  the European Commission
that the models and their impacts would be equivalent (Buchheim, 2001).
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let to rest again. 
Eventually,  the  obstacle  of  employee  involvement  was  overcome  by  the
suggestions  of  the  so-called  Davignon  Report  (European  Commission,  1997),
which was prepared by a group of high-ranking experts on European systems of
worker involvement presided by Etienne Davignon. Due to the great diversity of
national  models  of  employee  involvement,  the  group  pleaded  for  “negotiated
solution(s) tailored to cultural differences and taking account of the diversity of
situations. […] The path we are opening up is therefore that of negotiations in
good faith between the parties concerned, with a view to identifying the best
solution  in  each  case,  without  imposing  minimum  requirements”  (European
Commission, 1997, paragraphs 94c and 95). However, it needed another two
compromises before it could come to the “miracle of Nice” (Hirte, 2002:1).
The first compromise is the so-called “before and after” principle and was made
in  1998  (Herfs-Röttgen,  2001;  Blanquet  2002).  It  specifies  that  employees'
acquired rights regarding worker participation must be secured, meaning that
“rights in force before the establishment of the SE should provide the basis for
employee rights of involvement in the SE” (Directive 2001/86/EC, Recital 18).
After this agreement, only one Member State, namely Spain, still impeded the
deal. This anew standstill was overcome during the Nice Summit in December
2000  by  the  agreement  on  the  opting-out  clause,  which  was  added  due  to
Spain's urging (Köstler, 2001; Pluskat, 2001) and means that Member States
have  the  opportunity  to  make  it  possible  for  an  SE  to  register  without  an
agreement  on  the  involvement  of  employees  in  case  of  a  merger  between
companies  that  were  not  subject  to  worker  participation  so  far  (Directive
2001/86/EC, Recital 9). Eventually, the SE/Re and the SE/Di, which are specified
in more detail below, were enacted on October 8th, 2001. Consequently, the SE
could have been found by joint-stock companies on October 8th, 2004 for the first
time5.
The SE is available only for companies with certain legal forms, namely joint-
stock companies such as the British plc. or ltd. or the German AG or GmbH6.
Moreover, companies concerned must be subject to law in at least two Member
States (article 2 SE/Re). The SE, which has a separate legal personality, must be
seen as another  legal  alternative for  joint  stock companies doing business  in
5 The first SE has been established on October 12th, 2004 by Strabag Bauholding and is
registered in Klagenfurt, Austria (Gagawczuk, 2004; Zeiner, 2004).
6 For a comprehensive list of all legal forms concerned at least for the EU-15 the reader
is referred to the Annex of the SE/Re.
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Europe.  In  contrast  to  the  1970ies  draft  the  SE/Re  does  not  constitute  a
comprehensive European group law, but provides companies with an institutional
frame that is filled by national law. Consequently, it cannot be spoken about one
uniform SE but moreover it must be spoken of 287 different ones (Hommelhoff,
2001; Schwarz, 2001; Wiesner, 2001). 
The minimum capital, which, in general, must be divided in shares, amounts to
€ 120.000,--8. Additionally the abbreviation “SE”, which is provided exclusively
for European companies, must be put in front of or behind the company name
(SE/Re Article 11). For the internal corporate governance structure is specified
that  the  SE  must  have  a  general  meeting  of  shareholders  and  either  an
administrative board, so-called one-tier system, or a management board and a
supervisory board, so-called two-tier system, as governing bodies (SE/Re Articles
38 to 45 and 52 to 59). The companies are free to choose between the two
systems.
 
Generally speaking, there are four ways of establishing a SE. First of all, an SE
can  be  established  by  a  merger,  which  is  only  available  to  public  limited
companies from at least two different Member States9.  Secondly, a SE can be
found by the formation of a holding company, which is available to public and
private  limited  companies  that  have  their  registered  offices  in  at  least  two
different EU or EEA Member States or have subsidiaries or branches in Member
States other than that of their registered office. Thirdly, a SE can be established
by  the  formation  of  a  joint  subsidiary,  which  is  available  under  the  same
circumstances  applicable to the formation of  a holding company to  any legal
entities governed by public or private law. Finally, the SE can be found by the
conversion of a public limited company that was previously formed under national
law and had a subsidiary in at least one other Member State for at least two
years. Even though a (national) public limited company converted into a SE is not
allowed to move its registered office at  the same time as the transformation
takes place (SE/Re Article 37 paragraph 3) and is not allowed to reduce the form
of board-level  representation (SE/Di  Article 4 paragraph 4),  companies might
benefit from a transformation, because then they can choose freely between the
one-tier and the two-tier system of corporate governance. According to Wenz
(2003) this aspect increases undoubtedly the interest of companies in the SE. 
7 An SE can be established not only  by companies registered in  the EU but also by
companies registered in the European Economic Area (EEA) due to the decision by the
EEA joint committee (No 93/2002) to accept the SE/Re and the SE/Di.
8 Countries that are not members of the European Monetary Union are free to rule that
the capital  and the annual  reports are kept and presented in  the currency of that
country.
9 In this context, Member States refers to EU Member States and to EEA Member States.
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In addition, Wenz (2003) identifies another application of the European company
statute, the cross-border-SE that means the transfer of registered office (SE/Re
Article  7).  According  to  the  SE/Re  the  transfer  of  registered  office  does  not
require  liquidation  and  new  foundation  of  the  company  anymore.  Rather
companies are able to transfer their registered office by preserving their legal
identity  resulting  in  a  higher  degree  of  mobility  of  the  SE.  Even  though  the
possibility  to  transfer  the  registered  office  is  not  completely  unlimited,  as
aforementioned, the provisions increase considerably the mobility of European
companies.
As  mentioned  above  worker  involvement  is  governed  by  the  SE/Di  (see  for
instance Pluskat, 2001; Teichmann, 2002). The crucial link between the SE/Re
and the SE/Di is that the SE may not be registered unless an agreement on
arrangements  for  employee  involvement  has  been  concluded  (Article  12
paragraph 2 SE/Re;  see also Blanquet,  2002).  By that,  it  is  guaranteed that
these provisions are respected (Weiss, 2003). In this context, it is stressed that
the SE/Di does not affect national provisions with respect to worker involvement
at the plant level meaning that, for instance, the German Works Constitution Act
(Betriebsverfassungsgesetz – BetrVG) is still applicable (Köstler, 2002).
According  to  the  SE/Di  involvement  of  employees  is  understood  as  any
mechanism through which employees  or  their  representatives might influence
decision making within the company (Article 2 lit. h SE/Di). In this regard, the
SE/Di draws a clear distinction between information10 and consultation11 across
boarders  on  the  one  hand  and  participation12 on  the  other  (Heinze,  2002;
Teichmann,  2002;  Weiss,  2003).  While  a  proceeding  for  information  and
consultation must be established in every SE by creating a representative body,
the form of participation or co-determination in the SE is subject to negotiations.
These negotiations on worker involvement are conducted by the management
and  the  special  negotiating  body  (SNB),  which  consists  of  employees'
10Information means that  the competent organ of the SE informs the representative
body about any issues that concern the SE itself, its subsidiaries or its establishments
in another Member State so that the representative body is able to assess in depth the
possible impacts (Se/Di Article 2 lit. i).
11Consultation means the establishment of dialogue and exchange of views between the
representative body and the competent organ of the SE. The opinion expressed by the
representative body might be considered in the decision making within the SE (SE/Di
Article 2 lit. j).
12Participation means the influence of the representative body on the decision making
within the SE by the right to elect or appoint some of the members of the company’s
supervisory or administrative organ, or the right  to recommend and/or oppose the
appointment  of  some  or  all  of  the  members  of  the  company’s  supervisory  or
administrative organ (SE/Di Article 2 lit k).
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representatives  that  are elected  or  appointed in proportion to the number  of
employees employed in each Member State by the companies concerned (for
details see SE/Di Article 3). Generally speaking, the representative body and the
administrative or supervisory body of the SE “shall work together in a spirit of
cooperation” (SE/Di Article 9).
The task of the SNB is to negotiate an agreement on the arrangements for the
involvement  of  the  employees  within  the  SE  with  the  management  of  the
companies concerned (SE/Di Article 4). The agreement shall specify the scope of
the agreement, the composition, the functions, the procedure for information and
consultation, and the frequency of meetings of the representative body as well as
the financial and material resources to be allocated to the representative body. If
the SNB and the management agree on board-level representation, the number
of members and the procedure of their election, appointment, recommendation
or opposition by employees and their rights shall be specified in the agreement,
too. Additionally, it shall specify the date of entry into force, its duration, cases
were the agreement should be renegotiated and the procedure for renegotiation.
The duration of negotiations is fixed to six months from the establishment of the
SNB, but may be extended up to twelve months by agreement of the parties
involved (SE/Di Article 5). 
If the parties do not arrive at an agreement within the prescribed time and the
management still  wants to form a SE, or the parties involved agree so, then
standard rules apply (SE/Di Article 7 and part three of the annex), which are
distinguished into three parts in the annex of the SE/Di. The standard rules for
the composition of the representative body (SE/Di Annex part 1) as well as the
standard rules for information and consultation (SE/Di Annex part 2) are similar
to those that are set out in the Directive on European Works Councils (Council
Directive 94/45/EC; Weiss, 2003). In the following paragraph, the standard rules
for participation (SE/Di Annex part 3) are presented in more detail, because they
are seen as being crucial in this context (Weiss, 2003).
Which standard rules are applicable depends heavily on the form of foundation,
the board-level representation that was prevalent so far, and on the proportion
of all employees of the companies concerned who were covered by a certain form
of  co-determination  (SE/Di  Article  7).  Regarding  the  establishment  by
transformation,  the  standard  rules  apply,  when  the  company  concerned  was
subject to board-level representation so far meaning that the same form shall
continue to apply to the SE. Regarding establishment by merger, the standard
rules apply, when 25 percent of the total number of employees of the companies
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concerned were covered by some form of co-determination or even less than
25 percent  if  the  negotiating  parties  agree  on  its  application.  Regarding  the
establishment by formation of a holding/subsidiary, the standard rules apply, if
50 percent of the total number of employees of the companies concerned were
covered by some form of co-determination or even less than 50 percent if the
parties involved agree so. 
Besides  provisions  on  the  negotiation  procedure  and  the  standard  rules,  the
content  of  the  agreement  and  the  standard  rules,  the  SE/Di  contains
miscellaneous provisions as well. In section III of the SE/Di provisions regarding
the  reservation  and  confidentiality  (SE/Di  Article  8),  the  operation  of  the
representative  body  and  procedure  for  the  information  and  consultation  of
employees (SE/Di Article 9), the protection of employees’ representatives (SE/Di
Article 10), and the misuse of procedure (SE/Di Article 11) can be found, but are
not presented here in detail. 
Issues
After  having  presented  the  current  rulings  of  the  ECJ  regarding  freedom  of
establishment and the European company, the paper now turns to the issues
arising in this context: the issue of companies' governing law, and the issue of
harmonisation. The aim of this paper is not to plead for one or another approach,
but moreover to give the reader an impression of the concepts available and to
demonstrate how the two action alternatives fit into these concepts. 
First of all the issue of the governing law of an enterprise is discussed. Two major
approaches can be identified: real seat theory and incorporation theory. In the
literature, arguments in favour as well as against both theories can be found (see
for example Geiger, 2003). According to real seat theory13, which is seen as a
protection theory, the application of the governing law depends on the location of
the registered office of a company. The logic of real seat theory is seen in the
argument that companies should be governed by the law of the State where they
do  most  of  their  business,  or  how  Kern  (2004:97)  expresses  it  where  the
company  actually  “lives”  and  whose  people  are  concerned  of  these  activities
(Geiger,  2003).  In  other  words,  it  is  argued  that  the  control  of  these
organisations should be given to that state whose economic and political interests
are concerned mostly (Staudinger/Grossfeld, 1998). Thus, the State, where the
company  has  its  registered  office,  determines  the  law  applicable  to  the
13European countries following real seat theory are, inter alia, Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain (Staudinger/Grossfeld, 1998).
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company's internal and external relations. This means that all questions arising
from the “birth” to “death” of a company are evaluated according to the law, in
which the company is registered,  resulting in the dissolution of  the company
when the registered office is transferred to another country (Kern, 2004). 
According  to  incorporation  theory14,  the  application  of  the  governing  law  is
connected with the company's location of incorporation which is usually provided
in the statutes. Consequently, the country where the company was incorporated
determines  the  governing  law.  The  location  of  the  registered  office  is  of  no
importance in this context. Meaning the transfer of the registered office from one
country to another does not have any impact on the governing law. In contrast
to  real  seat  theory,  protection  of  various  interests  is  given  up  in  favour  of
founders' freedom to decide which regime offers the most favourable conditions
for  their  purposes  (Trefil,  2003;  Kern,  2004).  However,  the  weakness  of
incorporation  theory  is  seen  in  exactly  this  argument  of  regime  competition
meaning that companies tend to incorporate in those countries where the least
protective respectively most liberal company law is in place (Kern, 2004) possibly
resulting in the so-called Delaware effect or race to the bottom (Cary, 1974;
Fischel, 1982)15.
Regulatory competition can also be examined from the harmonisation perspective
that in general distinguishes between approximation and reciprocal recognition of
the laws of the Member States.  Simply put, incorporation theory is based on
reciprocal  recognition  of  the  laws.  Before  going  in  more  detail  on  that,
approximation of the laws is examined below. According to article 3 paragraph 1h
ECT,  the  approximation  of  the  laws  is  seen  as  a  useful  instrument  for  the
realisation of the common market. It is aimed to reduce transaction costs and
make the common market functioning without friction. Eventually the complete
approximation of the laws of the Member States would result in one European
legal order  meaning, from an economic  view, that  cross-boarder  transactions
would  not  cause  transaction  costs  anymore  and,  thus,  would  be  an  efficient
solution. However, it must be kept in mind that this is true only from a static
point  of view (Kern,  2004). Additionally, it is pointed out that the process  of
approximation of the laws might be sedately and cumbersomely especially with
an ever increasing number of Member States and, eventually, might freeze the
14European countries following incorporation theory are, inter alia,  Denmark, Finland,
Ireland,  Liechtenstein,  the Netherlands,  Norway,  Sweden,  and the United  Kingdom
(Staudinger/Grossfeld, 1998).
15In order to overcome the Delaware effect, incorporation theory has been subject to
several  modifications  resulting  in  numerous  mixed  approaches,  which  are  not
examined here in detail (for an overview see Halen, 2001).
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status-quo. If one considers the continuous struggle for adjustment to changing
environmental  conditions  as  the  main  issue,  then  other  legal  solutions  are
required.
Following economics, it is suggested that competitive markets generate optimal
results. In this context Kern (2004) equates centrally planned economies with
the approximation of the laws, which is outdated, and market economies with the
reciprocal recognition of the laws, which is viewed as an alternative solution in
the legal context. Even though regulatory competition might not be the panacea,
overall it might create more efficient results than approximation. In his analysis
Kern (2004:50) argues that “especially the great variety of legal ideas, which are
related with the huge differences in legal orders in Europe, improve enterprises'
abilities  to  adjust  to  changing  environmental  conditions”.  As  a  result  of  this
regime competition, agreeing with Kern (2004) it can be said that it is not the
least restrictive company law that will persist, but the company law that is able to
balance best the interests of all stakeholders. In other words, those company law
standards will persist that are in line with the market needs meaning standards
that  give  enterprises  the  opportunity  to  achieve  competitive  results  and
moreover to survive in a fast-changing environment in the long run.
At this point, the question arises as to the extent to which the ECJ rulings on the
freedom of establishment and the SE are concerned by these issues. As earlier in
this  paper,  the  analysis  starts  with  the  ECJ  rulings  on  the  freedom  of
establishment. Overall, the ECJ developed a consistent argumentation regarding
reciprocal  recognition of  companies  established in accordance with the law of
Member  States  that  follow incorporation theory  and gave  free  rein to  regime
competition  by  that  (Maul/Schmidt,  2003;  Spindler/Berner,  2004).  If  these
rulings really mean the end of  real  seat  theory  is still  an open question (for
example Borges,  2000; Fock, 2000; Schindler,  2002; Schanze/Jüttner,  2003),
even though proclaimed by some authors (for example Forsthoff, 2002; Lutter,
2003; Sandrock, 2004).
In fact, the ECJ took decisions on the moving out of an enterprise from a Member
State following incorporation theory to a Member State following incorporation
theory  (Daily  Mail,  Centros),  on  the  recognition  of  the  legal  capacity  of  a
company  established  in  a  Member  State  following  incorporation  theory  then
moving to a Member State following real seat theory (Überseering), and recently
on the question of additional limitations on foreign companies incorporated in a
Member  State  following  incorporation  theory  and  asking  for  registration  in  a
Member State that also follows incorporation theory (Inspire Art). However, it
Page 13
Issues
was not concerned with the question of a company's moving out from a Member
State that follows real seat theory until today (Roth, 2003; Zimmer, 2003). Such
a case could clarify the question as to the continuing validity of real seat theory,
but is not in sight at the moment.
Regarding the SE, the case is not so clear. With respect to the enacted legal acts,
the SE might be viewed as an accumulation of various compromises, but not as a
uniform legal frame for companies doing business across boarders in Europe. It is
even hard to believe that the agreement on the SE was celebrated for its extent
of approximation, when looking at the manifold choices and the great extent of
national law applicable supplementarily. For that reason, some authors argue (for
example Schulz/Geismar, 2001; Lutter, 2002) that the SE cannot be seen as a
means to approximate the company law in the Member States,  but might be
seen as a means to increase regulatory competition. In this context, Grundmann
(2001) argues that this regulatory competition should not be rejected but is even
desirable as far as this competition minimises state and market failure. 
Besides  regime  competition,  the  introduction  of  the  SE  might  lead  to  an
enhancement  of  competition  between  joint-stock  companies  governed  by
national  legislation  and  those  governed  by  European  legislation  as  well
(Theisen/Wenz,  2002)  due  to  comprehensive  scope  for  design given  to  the
management. While the management of a SE is free to choose between the one-
tier and the two-tier structure, can transfer its registered office without the SE
losing its legal personality at any time, and even is allowed to negotiate on the
form of employee involvement, national joint-stock companies do not have this
kind of choices. Consequently, regarding the issue of harmonisation, it can be
concluded  that  the  finally  agreed  SE,  originally  planned  as  a  comprehensive
European company law, increases pressures on the national legislators by the
manifold choices provided. If this all results eventually in a climb to the top or a
race  to  the  bottom  concerning  company  and  tax  law  as  well  employee
involvement practices in Europe will be subject to controversial debate further on
(Charny, 1991; Wymeersch, 2001) and might  advance formation of European
best practices.
Regarding  the  issue  of  the  governing  law,  the  answer  is  not  simply,  too.
Generally speaking, a SE must have its registered office – as fixed in its articles
of association – in the same Member State as its head office (Article 7, SE/Re).
Even though they must not necessarily be in the same place, this provision might
be  interpreted  as  evidence  in  favour  of  real  seat  theory  (Torggler,  2001).
Additionally, the fact that the governing law changes, when the registered and
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the  statutory  seat  are  transferred  to  another  Member  State,  might allow the
conclusion that the Council decided in favour of real seat theory. However, in
recital  27  of  the  SE/Re,  in  which  it  is  said  that  the  “real  seat  arrangement
adopted by this Regulation (…) is without prejudice to Member States’ laws and
does  not  pre-empt  any  choices  to  be  made  for  other  Community  texts  on
company law”, the Council of Ministers puts the issue in relative terms. Hence,
agreeing with Schwarz  (2001),  it  appears  that  the  Council  of  Ministers  shied
away from taking a decision either in favour of real seat theory or in favour of
incorporation theory.
After having separately examined these two action alternatives with respect to
the two issues, finally the reader's attention is drawn at the question as to the
extent the ECJ's rulings regarding the freedom of establishment and the SE are
consistent, respectively, constrain one another. For the comparison with respect
to the governing law, it is distinguished between the foundation of an enterprise
and the transfer of registered office. Regarding the foundation of an enterprise,
both action alternatives provide enterprises with the opportunity to establish in
that country that offers the most favourable conditions and to do business in any
other Member State without restrictions. 
However, regarding transfer of registered office the situation is differently. While
the registered office of a SE can be transferred without cessation, liquidation and
new foundation of the SE, the freedom of establishment does not grant such
right of moving out, which was even explicitly stated by the ECJ in Überseering.
In this context, Schindler (2003) argues that the principal constraint between the
SE  and  the  freedom  of  establishment  might  be  seen  in  the  fact  that  the
registered and the statutory office of the SE must be in the same country (Article
7 SE/Re). Another obstacle in this instance might be seen in the fact that when a
SE transfers its seats, then the governing law of the company chances, while the
governing  law  of  company  incorporated  in  a  Member  State  following
incorporation doctrine is still subject to that law. It is quite obvious that the two
initiatives constrain each other as to the issue of the governing law. However,
maybe the question should be asked differently. Does the SE limit or increase the
freedom of establishment? The answer to that question can only be that all in all
the SE increases the mobility of companies. It even appears that the SE provides
companies with opportunities that go beyond the granted rights of the freedom
of establishment.
Regarding  the  harmonisation  issue,  it  is  even  more  difficult  to  come  to  a
conclusion. At first glance, it seems that the two initiatives constrain one another.
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The ECJ's rulings on the freedom of establishment certainly militate in favour of
reciprocal recognition, while the SE appears being rather pro approximation of
the  Member  States'  company  law.  Though,  at  closer  inspection  the  situation
might be interpreted differently. As above-mentioned, the SE is characterised by
manifold  choices  and  a  great  extent  of  national  law  that  is  applicable
supplementarily. For that reason, the SE can hardly be understood as a means of
approximation. Although the two initiatives did not have the same aim originally,
it appears that they both increase or even start regulatory competition between
Member States. By and large, inconsistency could not be detected concerning the
aspect of harmonisation.
Resume
This  paper  dealt  with  the  interaction  of  the  ECJ  rulings  on  the  freedom  of
establishment and the European company Statute. In this context, two principal
issues, applicable law and harmonisation, were identified and discussed. The aim
of  the  paper  however  was  not  only  to  analyse  the  two  legal  initiatives  with
respect  to  the  issues,  but  moreover  to  examine  their  consistency.  After  the
above examination, the answer must be yes and no depending on the issue.
However,  with regarding to the impact of  the SE and the ECJ rulings on the
freedom of establishment the answer definitely must be in favour of consistency,
because  both  increase  regulatory  competition  and  consequently  increase
pressures on the national company laws. Overall, it seems that the ECJ did not
want to wait anymore until the Council of Ministers enacts relevant company law
directives or regulations, but pushes advancement in the field of company law by
case law recently. The SE might be viewed as an indicator that the Council of
Ministers  has  recognised  the  signs  of  time  and  has  accepted  the  challenge.
However,  future  developments  in  this  field  must  be  awaited,  before  final
conclusions can be drawn and before it can be said indubitably where the journey
goes to.
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